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Experimental analyses have identified significant tendencies for individuals to follow herd 
decisions, a finding which has been explained using Bayesian principles of statistical inference. 
This paper outlines the results from a herding task designed to extend these analyses. Empirically, 
we estimate logistic functions using panel fixed effect estimation techniques to quantify the impact 
of herd decisions on individuals‘ decisions about whether or not to buy a financial asset. We 
confirm that there are statistically significant propensities to herd and that social information about 
others‘ decisions has an impact on individuals‘ decisions. We extend these findings by identifying 
associations between herding propensities and individual characteristics such as gender, age and 
specific personality traits including impulsivity and venturesomeness. 
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Impacts of personality on herding in financial decision-making 
1. Introduction 
Herding occurs when individuals‘ private information is overwhelmed by the influence of public 
information about the decisions of a herd or group. Evidence of group influence in many economic 
and financial decisions is consistent with weaker conceptions of rationality: if we realise that our 
own judgement is fallible then it may be rational to assume that others are better informed and follow 
them (Keynes 1936, 1937). Many microeconomic models of herding assume that social information 
about others‘ decisions is used in a process of statistical inference e.g. in a Bayesian reasoning 
process in which individuals adjust their a posteriori probabilities as new social information arrives. 
If decision-making is Bayesian and probabilistic judgements are being updated systematically and 
logically then rational updating of probabilities will propel information about others‘ choices through 
a group, generating herding and ‗informational cascades‘.  
Alternatively, herding tendencies may emerge as people copy and imitate the actions of 
others - not because they judge that others know more about the fundamental long-term values of 
goods and assets but because agreeing with a group bestows a utility that is independent of the 
information implicit in others‘ decisions. In this case, the impact of social information may reflect 
the impact of sociological and psychological forces. Sociological factors will be important if 
normative influences such as social pressure encourage individuals to follow the decisions of others 
even in the face of contradictory objective information. Psychological factors and individual 
heterogeneity will moderate susceptibility to social influence. For personality traits that predispose 
individuals to particular emotional responses, the importance of personality traits is consistent with 
other economic analyses focussing on the role of emotions and affect in economic and financial 
decision-making (e.g. Elster 1996, 1998; Kamstra et al. 2003; Cohen 2005; Lo et al. 2005; Shiv et al. 
2005; DellaVigna 2009; Baddeley 2010). In this way personal characteristics including gender, age 
and personality traits affect an individual‘s propensity to herd.  
In this paper, we present experimental evidence confirming that there are significant 
propensities to herd when people make financial choices. When deciding whether or not to buy a 
stock, our experimental subjects were significantly more likely to agree with a herd than not. Also, 
we test competing explanations for this herding phenomenon in two stages. First, we estimate a 
model that is consistent with an objective, rational process of herding in which individuals are 
reasoning through some form of statistical inference (e.g. Bayesian updating) when making their 
choices. If herding is the outcome of such a reasoning process, then it will involve time-consuming 
deliberation and therefore we test the Bayesian hypotheses firstly by exploring whether or not 
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herding is associated with longer decision times. In the second empirical stage, we test the impact of 
individual differences on herding tendencies and thereby allow a role for behavioural factors on 
propensities to herd. This also provides a second test of the hypothesis that herding is a rational 
process because, if it is rational to herd then this implies that herding is the outcome of an objective 
reasoning process in which case individual differences in non-cognitive personality traits (i.e. traits 
not associated with the ability to apply statistical principles), should not exert a systematic influence 
on propensities to herd.  
To give a preview of our findings, our data do not fully support the predictions of the rational 
account of herding outlined above. For example, some of our empirical evidence suggests that 
herding is associated with shorter decision times. In addition, there are statistically significant 
individual differences in propensities to herd with herding more likely to be seen in younger, female, 
impulsive and/or venturesome individuals. Together these findings suggest that ―one-size-fits-all‖ 
explanations of herding based on principles of statistical reasoning and inference should be expanded 
to include individual differences. 
2.  Theoretical Background: Theories of Herding and Group Influence 
Herding occurs when individuals mimic others, ignoring their own substantive private information 
(Scharfstein and Stein 1990). There are many explanations for this impact of group influence on 
individuals‘ decisions. Here we focus on two main groups of explanation: rational learning 
explanations based around Bayesian updating assumptions, and explanations based on individual 
differences, drawing particularly on insights from sociology and psychology. It is important to 
emphasise that these explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
2.1 Rational Learning and Informational Cascades 
The most prominent microeconomic models of herding describe it as a rational learning process in 
which different people‘s decisions are interdependent and reinforcing. Individuals may rationally 
judge that others‘ actions contain useful information (Keynes 1930, 1936, 1937) and, in a world of 
uncertainty, rational inferences can be made using Bayes‘s rule (Salop 1987): Bayesian updating of a 
priori probabilities will draw upon an extensive set of information - including social information 
about the observed actions of others.  A key problem with Bayesian herding is that useful private 
information is discounted in favour of information about the actions of the herd (Scharfstein and 
Stein 1990).  
To illustrate the principles: Banerjee (1992) develops a herding model in which people look 
at what others are doing, e.g. when making fertility choices, in voting, and in financial decision-
making. Herding will be the outcome of a rational but potentially misguided information gathering 
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process.  Banerjee gives the example of restaurant choice adapted here to the financial choices 
analysed in the empirical section. Let us assume that individuals have the option to buy a particular 
asset, e.g. a stock, and the ―buy‖ versus ―reject‖ decisions are favoured a priori 51% and 49% 
respectively. A group of 100 people are making sequential decisions about whether or not to buy the 
stock. If 99 out of 100 people have private signals (such as advice from an investment advisor) 
indicating that the stock price is likely to fall then, assuming complete access to all private signals, 
on the basis of the aggregate evidence it could be inferred that a given individual should reject the 
stock. Assume however that Person 1 is the 100
th
 person with a misleading private signal (favouring 
a ―buy‖ decision) but is the first to decide. Then the group as a whole will buy the stock on the basis 
of the misleading financial advice upon which the first person based their decision. The sequence of 
events that generates this outcome is as follows. Person 1 buys the stock on the basis of their 
(misleading) private signal. Person 2 is the next to choose. She knows the a priori probability 
(favouring a buy decision), has a correct private signal favouring a reject decision and has public, 
social information about the prior actions of Person 1. Applying Bayes‘s rule and assuming that she 
weights these last two pieces of information equally, the information about Person 1‘s choice will 
cancel out Person 2‘s own private signal. So Person 2 will rationally choose to buy the stock on the 
basis of prior probabilities (marginally favouring a buy decision). Similarly Person 3 will decide to 
buy on the basis of Person 1 and 2‘s choices and so on – the impact of the incorrect signal will 
cascade through the herd and the herd will move towards a buy decision even though 99% of private 
signals favour a reject decision. Equally, the herd would have headed in the right direction if another 
person had been first to choose but nonetheless Banerjee emphasises that this neglect of relevant 
information by the herd may generate a negative ‗herding externality‘ if important, relevant private 
information is ignored in the aggregate.  The informational value of 99 pieces of correct private 
information recommending that the share should be rejected will be lost and, even though behaviour 
is Bayes rational, the impact of relevant private information will be limited. 
Bikhanchandi, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992, 1998) develop a similar model of sequential 
decision-making in which informational cascades explain localised conformity which emerges when 
it is optimal for an individual to follow the actions of his/her predecessor and to disregard his private 
information. Just as is seen in Banerjee‘s model each sequential decision conveys no real new 
evidence to subsequent members of the herd. In both models, herding is described as a boundedly 
rational response to imperfect information and will generate convergence onto an outcome 
determined by social information about herd actions rather than private information.  Private 
information becomes inefficiently uninformative, sometimes leading to convergence of behaviour 
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onto stable outcomes but often leading to convergence onto idiosyncratic and fragile outcomes 
(Chamley 2003).
2
 
A large number of economic experiments have been conducted to test Bayesian theories of 
rational herding, starting with Anderson and Holt (1996, 1997). Many of these experiments verify 
Bayesian hypotheses but without assessing the differential explanatory power of their Bayesian 
hypotheses against competing alternative hypotheses about why people herd.  Others have extended 
this experimental evidence to distinguish between herding as a broad descriptive category of copying 
behaviours and informational cascades as a specific form of learning that arises in uncertain 
situations (e.g. see Sgroi 2003, Çelen and Kariv 2004, Alevy et al. 2007). Following Avery and 
Zemsky (1998) Park and Sgori (2009) allow rational herding and rational contrarianism (behaviour 
contrary to herd choices) in a herding experiment that allows multiple states and multiple signals. 
They observe both rational and irrational contrarianism but generally 70% of their experimental 
subjects‘ behaviour is consistent with their benchmark for rationality. When they correct for those 
who don‘t trade (i.e. the irrational non-traders) behaviour becomes predictable . They conclude that 
policy makers should be careful not to categorise all herding as irrational: with rational herding, 
improved information and clearer signals would lead to a decrease in herding. 
Mostly, the experimental literature establishes that there is a systematic pattern in herding 
behaviour though it does not establish that Bayesian belief-based explanations are superior to 
alternative explanations including those consistent with sociological and psychological analyses.  
One notable exception is Cipriani and Guarino (2005) who adapt Bayesian models to incorporate 
flexible prices in a model in which cascades cannot occur. They find that some subjects either do not 
use their private information, choosing either not to trade or to ignore private information but 
engaging in contrarian trading. Ivanov et al. (2009) also assess Bayesian modes of thinking and find 
that experimental subjects are not necessarily using probabilistic thinking and may be using 
boundedly rational, insight-based rules of thumb, instead of belief based reasoning.  
2.2 The role of individual difference 
Bayesian theories of rational updating of probabilistic judgements using social information describe 
individual decision-making emerging from the application of a mechanical algorithm in which 
information about group decisions is used to update individuals‘ probabilistic judgements. This 
approach suggests that individuals‘ behaviours are essentially homogenous; different people will, on 
average at least, behave in the same way. But there is general evidence that decision-making is not 
just the outcome of statistical inference; furthermore, people are not necessarily competent in 
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  See also Kirman (1993) for a herding model based on different statistical assumptions. 
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applying principles of statistical inference in practice (Salop 1987; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; 
Baddeley et al. 2005). For example, cognitive biases may limit rational behaviour in ‗reverse 
cascades‘ –when incorrect decisions lead to information cascades down the wrong path (Sgroi 2003).  
Also, there is evidence that economic and financial decisions are affected by individual 
differences and psychological factors; personality traits will affect decision-making if they generate 
particular emotional predispositions (Elster 1996, 1998; Baddeley 2010). Kamstra et al. (2003) and 
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) analyse the impact of weather-related mood changes on financial 
markets to show that fluctuations in emotions and mood affect financial and economic decisions. Lo, 
Repin and Steenbarger (2005) identified roles for personality traits and fear/greed in the behaviour of 
day traders. Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio and Damasio (2005), using lesion patient studies, 
identify a relationship between impaired emotional response and risk-taking behaviour. Kuhnen and 
Knutson (2005) identify deviations from rational behaviour in financial decision-making and use 
fMRI evidence to identify a role for emotion and affect. These analyses, and others, suggest that 
emotions and moods have significant impacts on economic / financial decisions and there may be 
similar interactions between tendencies to herd and specific psychological characteristics.  
Building on these insights, alternative explanations for herding can be grounded in principles 
of social psychology, particularly sociological analyses of the influence of crowds and group 
pressure as developed from le Bon‘s (1896) insights about mob psychology. Social psychology 
emphasises that situational influences have a significant impact on individual decisions, in the 
extreme provoking seemingly inappropriate levels of obedience to authority (Milgram 1963; Haney 
et al. 1973). Asch (1951, 1955) presented evidence from controlled experiments which showed that, 
when asked to make simple judgements about the lengths of lines, a substantial minority of 
experimental subjects were susceptible to intra-group pressure and were persuaded to change their 
minds in the face of deliberately misleading decisions from experimental confederates, with effects 
increasing as group size and consensus increased.  It is plausible that situational pressures operate in 
an economic and financial context too.
3
 It is difficult to establish whether wrong choices in Asch-
style tasks are the result of the subjects‘ perceptions of their own visual limitations and/or an attempt 
to avoid conflict: for example, Shiller (1995) argues that Asch‘s findings are not inconsistent with a 
rational learning process because experimental subjects will herd even when normative social 
influence is removed: they will follow decisions of a group of computers in much the same way that 
they will follow a human herd‘s decision. Experimental subjects tend to attribute their mistakes to 
their own physical limitations, such as poor eyesight. The operation of social influence even without 
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See Bond and Smith 1996 for a survey of evidence on Asch-style tasks.  
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human face-to-face interactions can be interpreted as evidence that social conformity is a 
manifestation of information acquisition (Deutsch and Gerard 1955; Bikhchandani et al. 1992). On 
the other hand, theory of mind (―mind reading‖) explanations explain that herding operates even 
without face-to-face interactions if imagined peer pressure acts similarly to real peer pressure. So one 
theorist can argue that Asch‘s evidence does not disprove the rational herding hypothesis but another 
can equally argue that it does, depending on what is assumed about human cognition and emotion. 
Experimental evidence testing competing explanations has the power to resolve such impasses. 
2.3 Reconciling Rational and Socio-Psychological Theories of Herding  
In the preceding sections, we presented distinct explanations for herding drawing upon ideas from 
economics, sociology and psychology. The approaches are clearly not mutually exclusive: the 
sociological distinction between normative influences from wanting to conform versus the 
informational influences that emerge with learning from others‘ actions is a distinction which also 
surfaces in the economic literature on conformity (e.g. see Bernheim 1994; Becker and Murphy 
2000). Bayesian learning theories cannot account fully for the impact of social influence (Bernheim 
1994). The limited nature of this literature in part reflects difficulties of effectively modelling social 
factors. One solution is to embed social factors (such as status and reputation) into individuals‘ 
preferences (Bernheim 1994; Scharfstein and Stein 1990).   
Another possibility however is that apparently disparate approaches are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Real-world herding behaviour may be the outcome of interplays between 
rational/cognitive and instinctive/emotional processes as well as a reflection of sociological and 
psychological impacts emerging from situations and individual predispositions (Baddeley 2010). If 
decisions to herd are associated both with decision times and with individual differences then this 
would support models of behaviour which emphasise interactions between controlled, cognitive, 
automatic and affective processes in human economic and financial decision-making. When people 
are influenced by social information then this may reflect an interaction between a deliberative 
learning process and a more instinctive, affective, emotional response. This hybrid explanation 
would also be consistent with evolutionary principles. Herding instincts are widely observed 
throughout the animal kingdom, in species as diverse as honey bees, ants, antelope, sheep and cows 
and whilst such instincts may have impulsive aspects, evolutionary pressure may have led to the 
evolution of these instincts to enable social learning: animals better able to monitor the actions of 
others will acquire social information about resource availability and mating potential and these 
animals will be more likely to reproduce (Danchin et al. 2004). In a similar way, socially influenced 
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herding instincts may have evolved as a learning ‗heuristic‘ or simple rule-of-thumb, enabling us to 
easily acquire important social information about the potential value of our acquisitions. 
3. Experimental Hypotheses 
To test the different models outlined above, we develop two broad hypotheses to contrast 
explanations based on objective factors versus subjective factors / individual differences:  
3.1 Herding as the outcome of rational deliberation 
If, following the microeconomic models described above, herding is a boundedly rational 
phenomenon associated with deliberative, cognitive processes reflecting information gathering and 
processing, then it will involve the application of principles of statistical inference such as Bayes‘s 
Rule. If herding is a deliberative process, based on objective factors and requiring deliberation then 
people will need thinking time when they follow a herd. Individual differences, e.g. in personality 
traits, will have no systematic impact on the propensity to herd.  
In experimentally capturing deliberative herding, we follow Reddi et al. (2003) and Reddi and 
Carpenter (2000) in using reaction times as a proxy for time-consuming deliberative thought.
4
 To 
justify this proxy we adopt the Schneider-Shiffrin separation of automatic versus controlled 
processes (Schneider and Shiffrin 1977; Kahneman 2003; Frederick et al. 2004, Camerer et al. 2004, 
2005). Reasoning using methods of statistical inference involves objective decision-making and 
controlled cognitive processing. Cognition is the outcome of slower, more deliberative processes 
because it draws on higher-order, complex executive functions. On the other hand, affect is non-
cognitive, links directly with motivation and so operates very quickly. Cognitive processes will 
require more time and effort than automated emotional, affective, instinctive responses (Zajonc 
1984). So if following the herd is a rational learning process founded upon principles of statistical 
inference such as Bayesian updating then it will be controlled, cognitive, effortful and time-
consuming and it will be associated with longer decision times.  
3.2 Herding as the product of individual differences  
If herding reflects individual differences rather than an objective process of information acquisition 
and processing then individual characteristics and heterogeneity amongst people will have a 
significant and systematic impact. Conversely, if the Bayesian explanation is complete, then some 
individual differences in age, gender and personality will have no significant systematic impact.
5
 
                                                 
4
 Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that decision times may be a limited measure of Bayesian reasoning 
processes. For example, Sgroi‘s (2003) experimental evidence from Bayesian herding games identifies associations 
between longer decision times and cognitive bias in reverse cascades suggesting that longer decision times may reflect 
general confusion rather than a systematic deliberative process.  
5
 Some personality traits may be correlated with cognitive ability, an issue addressed in section 6. 
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Decision times are not likely to be longer but may be shorter if herding is an automated, affective 
response. Furthermore, individual differences and shorter decision-times may interact if people with 
particular personality traits are predisposed to make quick, emotionally-driven decisions. We start by 
hypothesising that sociable, empathetic individuals are more responsive to social influence and so 
will be more likely to herd. In assessing the impact of visceral and/or emotional factors we also 
postulate that quickly-processed emotions may be implicated in herding in which case herding is 
more likely to be seen in impulsive and venturesome individuals. In addition, gender and age are 
included on the basis of evidence that conformity is an (inverse) function of age (Walker and 
Andrade 1996) and is more prevalent amongst women (Milgram 1963).  
3.3 A hybrid explanation 
It is also possible that herding reflects an interaction of deliberative and affective factors. If social 
information plays some role in decision-making but is moderated by individual differences. For 
example, if herding is a time-saving decision-making heuristic, then certain personality types will be 
more likely to use a herding heuristic as a decision-making shortcut. This would be consistent with 
Herbert Simon‘s (1979) concept of procedural rationality, i.e. behaviour is adapted to specific 
circumstances and will involve the application of common-sense rather than mathematical or 
statistical algorithms / rules (Baddeley 2006). 
4. Experimental Design 
4.1 Experimental Context 
Following Pillas (2006) and Baddeley et al. (2007) the stock-picking task used here was designed 
(using COGENT graphics and MATLAB7) as a computer simulated task for a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) analysis (see also Burke et al. 2009). Whilst the context of the experiment 
is therefore relatively artificial the use of a computer-based design was justified on the basis of 
evidence that experimental subjects are affected in similar ways by the actions of virtual and real 
experimental confederates (Reysen 2005). The presentation of the information adopts a similar task 
design to that used by Berns, Chappelow, Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski and Richards (2005) in 
their exploration of the impact of social conformity in mental rotation tasks; in particular our design 
adopts their approach to task sequencing and the presentation of social information.  
4.2 Task Structure  
The experiments analysed here capture the propensity to herd in a stock-picking task for which each 
experimental subject has to decide whether or not to buy a particular stock. In making their 
decisions, experimental subjects were given two sources of information sequentially. First they were 
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given private information in the form of a chart of stock prices over the preceding month. Then they 
were given social information about the decisions of a group of four (the ―herd‖).  
 Each trial of the task consisted of the following stages: 
Stage 1: Subjects were given their own ―private‖ information about the past performance of the stock 
in the form of an artificially generated time series of daily stock returns over a year. These charts 
were presented to all subjects in four combinations of high /low mean and high/low variance stocks. 
In addition, charts of scrambled stock images were used as controls. See Fig 1a. 
Stage 2: Subjects were then presented with social information about the herd choices – with the 
―herd‖ represented as 4 faces.6 The choices of the group/herd were represented on the computer 
screen with a tick mark (‗buy‘) or a cross (‗reject‘) above each face photo. There were four types of 
herd decision: +4 (all decided to buy), 2-2 (half of the herd buys, the other half rejects), -4 (all reject) 
and a control scenario in which no group decision was conveyed. See Fig 1b. The experimental 
subjects were told that the people represented by these faces had been involved in a pilot experiment 
and that their choices were real, informed choices based on the same information shown to the 
experimental subjects. A herding control condition was used to capture the extent to which social 
information about herd decisions was being used as a real decision-making tool, by running the tasks 
with a herd represented by 4 chimpanzee faces. The experimental subjects were told that the chimps 
had no understanding of the task and did not care about money as a reward. 
                                                 
6
 The face stimuli were kindly provided by Bruno Rossion of the Cognition & Development Research Unit, Université 
Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. 
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For Stages 1 and 2, the images of private and social information were shown for 1.5 seconds for each 
image, considerably longer than the average reaction time (0.4s) of human traders (Broyon and 
Duka, 2006). 
Stage 3: After seeing the social information about the herd‘s choice, subjects were then asked to 
decide whether or not to buy the stock by pressing one of two buttons on a button-box. Decisions and 
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decision times were collected at this stage. Decision times were collected because, as explained in 
section 3.1, we hypothesise that a decision to go with the herd reflects either a time-consuming 
deliberative reasoning process and/or individual characteristics affecting an individual‘s emotional 
susceptibility to social influence. 
To summarise, in total there were 20 task scenarios (5 private information scenarios x 4 social 
information scenarios) as shown in the following matrix: 
SCENARIO MATRIX 
Private information: Stock Image   Social information: Herd choices 
i. High mean, high variance (HMHV)  i. Herd buys (+4) 
ii. High mean, low variance (HMLV)  ii. Herd split (2-2) 
iii. Low mean, high variance (LMHV)  iii. Herd rejects (-4) 
iv. Low mean, low variance (LMLV)  iv. No herd signal (NS) 
v. Scrambled image (SCRAMBLE) 
 +4 2-2 -4 NS 
HMHV 1 2 3 4 
HMLV 5 6 7 8 
LMHV 9 10 11 12 
LMLV 13 14 15 16 
SCRAMBLE 17 18 19 20 
Each task scenario was used twice (once for a human herd and again for a chimp herd) with 12 
repetitions for each of the 20 task scenarios so there were 480 trials per experimental subject. To 
prevent learning and superstitious effects, no feedback was given whilst the subjects were 
performing the task.  
4.3 Experimental subjects and participant incentives 
The 17 right-handed healthy subjects (11 females and 6 males) were recruited via advertisements on 
the University of Cambridge campus and on a local community website. The mean age of 
participants was 24.3 years and all were native English speakers. All participants gave informed 
consent, and the Local Research Ethics Committee of the Cambridgeshire Health Authority approved 
the study.  
 The experimental incentives were designed following behavioural piloting to ensure that the 
participants did not mindlessly buy every stock offered to them. To avoid the interpretative 
complications of non-linearity in value functions, as highlighted both in critiques of subjective utility 
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theory and in developments of cumulative prospect theory, the task and its context was simplified in 
a number of ways. Participants were paid a ―show-up‖ fee of £20 and instructed that they could buy 
each stock at the mean price of its particular distribution and would be rewarded if they bought high 
performing stocks. To prevent loss aversion biases, the participants were told that they could not lose 
more than their initial show-up fee. Participants earned £32.50 on average (including the initial £20).  
 Before the official experimental trials, the design and purpose of the experiment was made 
clear by issuing the experimental subjects with detailed instructions in the form of a slide 
presentation (see Appendix 1) as well as giving them prior training in the execution of the task. To 
minimise error trials during scanning, participants learned the timings and sequencing of task events 
for 20 training trials no more than 7 days prior to scanning.     
4.4 Measuring individual differences 
After the task had been completed, the experimental subjects completed a range of personality 
and other questionnaires as well as post-scanning interviews to test the hypothesis that individual 
characteristics, including psychological traits, will predispose individuals to a herding response. A 
range of psychological traits were measured using published psychometric tests. Impulsivity, 
venturesomeness and empathy were measured using Eysenck‘s Impulsivity, Venturesomeness and 
Empathy (IVE) questionnaire (Eysenck and Eysenck 1978). Extraversion and Psychoticism were 
measured using Eysenck‘s Personality Revised Questionnaire – EPQR (Eysenck and Eysenck 1975, 
1978; Eysenck, Eysenck and Barrett 1985).  
4.5 Econometric analysis  
 Below we assess the impact of the economic, sociological and psychological factors outlined above 
using econometric techniques to test the experimental hypotheses introduced in section 3. As 
explained above, the experimental subjects were making binary choices about: firstly –whether or 
not to buy a particular stock; and secondly –whether or not to buy a stock conditioned upon the 
social information provided about a herd‘s decision. Denoting H=1 as a decision that coincides with 
the herd‘s decision and  as the information set, including both private and social information, the 
probability of herding is given by: E(H | ) Pr(H 1| ) pherd  
Following Brock and Durlauf (2000), behaviour is modelled as a discrete choice and estimated using 
binary dependent variable estimation techniques viz. logit using the logistic function
7
:  
)exp(1
)exp(
)(
x
x
xGpherd   (1) 
                                                 
7
 In capturing preferences to buy and/or to herd, logit was selected over probit because we could not assume that the 
distribution of choices would follow a standard normal distribution. 
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where x  is a matrix of explanatory variables and accompanying parameters. 
Panel fixed effect estimation techniques were used to capture the fact that the preferences of 
individual experimental subjects may vary and to overcome problems of endogeneity created by 
heterogeneity bias in a panel estimation context. We use z tests to test the individual significance of 
each explanatory variable ( 0:0 kH ) and we use a likelihood ratio test to test the overall 
explanatory power ( 0:0 kH ). Estimations were conducted using the statistical package 
STATA. 
5. Results and Interpretation 
Our statistical / econometric analysis is designed to discover first –whether social information about 
the choices of a herd or group of people changes the probability that our experimental subjects will 
buy a particular stock, and second– in decisions to go with the herd, which factors increase the 
probability that a person will follow the herd. The econometric analysis assesses these two questions 
in turn. The first set of estimations corroborates existing economic experimental evidence (cited 
earlier) about tendencies to herd. The probabilities of buying a stock are significantly higher when 
the subjects are told that the herd has bought the stock. The second set of estimations focuses on 
capturing the decision to follow the herd in terms of objective factors versus individual differences. 
This is done to separate explanations of herding that assume a rational, objective decision-making 
process from explanations that focus on individual differences and socio-psychological factors.  
Table 1 shows the conditional probabilities of buying and herding in the various experimental 
scenarios, including both chimp and human scenarios.  Assuming no social or private information is 
available, the baseline probability that a person will buy a stock is 50.0)1Pr( buypBuy  because 
TABLE 1 - CONDITION AL PROBABILITIES  
    
  Subject buys Subject herds 
All scenarios    
 0.503 0.696 
   
Private information scenarios   
Share price chart: High mean 0.574 0.695 
 Small variance 0.597 0.643 
 High mean, small variance 0.607 0.634 
 Scrambled 0.261 0.331 
    
Social information scenarios   
Herd decision:  Buy 0.703 0.703 
 Reject 0.312 0.688 
 Split 0.530 n/a 
 No information 0.468 n/a 
 Human herd 0.516 0.774 
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there is no reason to expect the person to favour a buy versus reject decision. The results in Table 1 
confirm that the unconditional 
buyp  for subjects in our sample is 0.50. Experimental subjects were 
more likely to buy stocks with a high mean and/or a small variance which is consistent with the 
behaviour predicted by mean-variance analysis. 
As explained in section 2, the concept of herding implies that the agreement of the herd and 
the experimental subject is not a coincidence. For the scenarios in which the herd made a clear 
choice to either buy or reject (i.e. the +4 and –4 scenarios), there are 4 possible combinations of 
subject and herd decisions, as follows: 
  Herd’s choice 
 
  Buy Reject 
Experimental 
subject’s choice   
Buy Buy, Buy Buy, Reject 
Reject Reject, Buy Reject, Reject 
 These four scenarios are mutually exclusive and exhaustive so the unconditional a priori 
likelihood that a subject will coincidentally agree with the herd decision is 50%, i.e. 
Pr(Agree 1) pagree 0.50. We hypothesise that if people are being persuaded by a herd‘s decisions 
then this will lead to a significant increase in buyp if the herd buys; if the herd rejects a stock then this 
leads to a significant decrease in pbuy. We hypothesise that the probability of herding is higher than 
the unconditional probability of coincident subject and herd decisions, i.e. pherd pagree   where 
5.0agreep . The experimental data show a herding probability of 70%, which is statistically 
significantly larger than 0.50.
8
  The likelihood of human herding, i.e. following the human herd as 
opposed to the chimp herd is 77%, which is also statistically significantly higher than the overall 
probability of herding indicating that the experimental subjects are taking the human herd decisions 
more seriously than the chimp herd decisions. This is consistent with the hypotheses that herding is a 
form of social learning and/or that Bayesian reasoning is involved when social information is 
presented to experimental subjects. 
5.1 Capturing revealed preferences: when do subjects buy? 
For the first set of econometric estimations, logistic functions for a ―buy‖ decision were estimated in 
two stages to mirror the stages of the experimental subjects‘ decision-making and also to overcome 
                                                 
8
 H0: pherd =0.50, H1: pherd >0.50, z
0.703 0.50
0.50 0.50
8160
36.68 [p=0.000]. 
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potential econometric problems of endogeneity. In the first stage revealed preferences for the 4 
combinations of high /low mean/variance stocks were analysed, conditioned on subject-specific fixed 
effects using a different dummy variable for each experimental subject. These dummies were 
included to capture individual differences in propensities to buy. Thus, for a given individual i, the 
probability of a ―buy‖ decision is given by: 
pbuy,i f ( p,ai)   (2) 
where 
p
 is the private information made available to each experimental subject in the form of a 
stock chart, as described above, and ai is the fixed effect for each subject capturing the differences 
across the experimental subjects in the predicted probabilities of a buy decision. 
In the second stage, to capture the differential impact of herd information, the predicted 
probabilities from the first stage were used in the estimation of the probability of a buy decision 
conditioned on social information about herd decisions:  
),ˆ( ,, herdibuyibuy pfp  (3) 
where ibuyp ,ˆ  is the predicted probability from the first stage and herd  is the social information about 
herd decisions. 
The results from these two estimation stages are shown in Table 2. The results summarised in Table 
2A were used to get predicted probabilities of a buy decision given private information. These 
predicted probabilities were then included in the estimation outlined in Table 2B, to capture the 
additional impact on buy probabilities of social information about herd decisions.  
TABLE 2 –LOGIT ESTIMATION: BUY DECISION 
Dependent variable: SBUY (=1 if buys, =0 if rejects) n=8160 
2A - As function of private information 
 
Odds  
ratio Std. error  z score p value 
High mean 1.488               0.047        8.420                     0.000 
Low variance 1.804               0.047          12.480                     0.000 
Subject-specific fixed effects (ai): 
Subject 1 1.442 0.191 2.770 0.006 
Subject 2 0.629 0.084 -3.490 0.000 
Subject 3 0.543 0.073 -4.560 0.000 
Subject 4 1.148 0.151 1.050 0.293 
Subject 5 1.481 0.196 2.960 0.003 
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Subject 6 0.991 0.130 -0.070 0.948 
Subject 7 0.574 0.077 -4.160 0.000 
Subject 8 2.153 0.293 5.640 0.000 
Subject 9 1.100 0.145 0.720 0.470 
Subject 10 1.009 0.132 0.070 0.948 
Subject 11 0.590 0.079 -3.960 0.000 
Subject 12 1.119 0.147 0.850 0.393 
Subject 13 1.220 0.161 1.510 0.131 
Subject 14 1.179 0.155 1.250 0.212 
Subject 15 0.950 0.125 -0.390 0.694 
Subject 16 0.917 0.121 -0.660 0.511 
Subject 17 1.442 0.191 2.770 0.006 
2
(df=18) = 503.31 [p=0.000]   
Log likelihood = -5404.25   
 
2B – As function of social information 
 
Odds  
ratio 
Std. 
error  z score p value 
Predicted pbuy  
(from 2A above) 1.032 0.015 2.080 0.037 
Herd buys 2.382 0.138 15.040 0.000 
Herd rejects 0.455 0.026 -13.790 0.000 
LR 
2
(df=3)=648.07 [p=0.000]   
Log likelihood = -5331.868   
 
The results reported in Table 2A confirm information from conditional probabilities above and the 
statistically significant [p=0.000] z scores on ―high mean‖ and ―low variance‖ show respectively that 
the experimental subjects are significantly more likely to choose high mean and/or low variance 
stocks. As noted above, this suggests that they are behaving as predicted in mean-variance analysis. 
In addition, the z scores on the dummy variables included to capture individual differences are 
significantly different from zero [p<0.05] for 8 of the experimental subjects indicating that there is 
considerable heterogeneity of preferences across the sample of experimental subjects. This is 
preliminary evidence that individual differences are important and that individuals‘ decisions are not 
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the outcome of purely objective, economic factors. Table 2B shows the impact of social information 
on individuals‘ decisions. Confirming the conditional probabilities from Table 1, the z scores on 
―Herd Buys‖ and ―Herd Rejects‖ show that there is a statistically significant [p=0.000] increase in 
the tendency to buy when the herd buys; and a statistically significant [p=0.000] decrease in the 
tendency to buy when the herd rejects (baseline scenarios are that the herd is split 2-2 or that there is 
no herd information). 
To summarise findings from these first estimations of buy probabilities: subjects are on average 
more likely to buy high mean, low variance stocks. Information about herd decisions has a 
significant impact with the experimental subjects more likely to buy a stock when the herd is buying 
it, thus confirming previous evidence that herd information changes people‘s decisions.  
5.2 Why do subjects follow the herd? 
To further analyse the propensity to herd conditioned on subject specific differences we next 
estimate the probability that a subject will agree with the herd.
9
 We analyse econometrically the 
hypotheses about herding as outlined in section 3 in two stages. To recap: the competing 
explanations for herding are first – that herding is the outcome of an objective, rational decision-
making process in which social information about group/herd decisions is processed systematically 
alongside private information; and second – that herding is the product of individual differences and 
non-economic factors such as personality traits, gender and age. These factors might predispose 
experimental subjects to particular emotional responses that would encourage herd-copying 
behaviour.  
As explained above, herding implies a non-random choice to copy what the herd is doing and so 
must necessarily capture something other than the probability of coincidentally agreeing with the 
herd. In estimating herding propensities, as for the previous estimations we initially include fixed 
effect dummies to capture individual differences – ia  but further estimations were also run in which 
herding probabilities were conditioned on the specific measures of individual differences.
10
 The 
herding probabilities were estimated assuming that a combination of factors determining an 
individual‘s propensity to herd adapting equation (1) as follows: 
)exp(1
)exp(
),(|Pr(
x
x
Hp hpherd   (4) 
                                                 
9
 Additional estimations showed that there was no statistically significant association between probability of buying and 
probability of herding. 
10
 The fixed effects cannot be included alongside these other measures of individual differences because this would 
create a problem of perfect multicollinearity between the fixed effects and the matrix of subject-specific characteristics. 
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where x —the vector of explanatory variables includes d — decision time and either ai or specific 
measures of individual characteristics including gender, age and personality traits. In the Bayesian 
herding models decision-makers are discounting potentially meaningful private information (
p
) 
and favouring social information about the herd‘s decisions ( h ). The rational herding hypothesis is 
tested using d, included to capture the extent to which herding is a deliberative decision, consistent 
with models of rational herding in which people are applying principles of statistical inference. As 
explained in section 3, if individual characteristics are significant then this would suggest that 
herding is the outcome of individual, possibly subjective, factors and so is not necessarily strictly 
rational in the sense that it is driven by objective factors. 
The results from estimations including only private information and decision-time are outlined in 
Table 3.Some private information about the type of stock is significantly associated with propensities 
to herd: the experimental subjects were significantly more likely to herd when offered a high 
variance stock; they were also significantly more likely to herd when social information was from a 
human herd, suggesting that herding does reflect a genuine attempt to decipher meaningful 
information. The decision time variable is negatively associated with decisions to herd [p=0.045] but 
the impact is very small. This may undermine theories of herding which suggest that herding is a 
strategy associated with deliberation and the rational application of principles of statistical inference 
because, as explained above, we could expect that such deliberation should take more time rather 
than less. However, this does not necessarily prove that cognition is not implicated in herding 
decisions: reasoning processes can become automated through practice (Kahneman 2003) and if 
Bayesian herding is transformed into learning heuristics that become automated at an early age, then 
the fact that herding is not controlled, slow and time-consuming does not necessarily mean that they 
are free of reasoning and deliberation. Herding may be a quick decision-making heuristic that seems 
to substitute for deliberation. 
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TABLE 3:  
Is herding moderated by private information? 
Dependent variable: H (=1 if agree with herd; =0 otherwise) 
n=4080     
   
 Odds ratio 
Std. 
Err. Z P>|z| 
High mean 0.913 0.072 -1.160 0.247 
Low variance 0.543 0.043 -7.700 0.000 
Scrambled signal 0.572 0.059 -5.380 0.000 
Human herd 2.148 0.151 10.850 0.000 
Decision time 1.000 0.000 -2.000 0.045 
LR 
2
 (5)= 189.16 [p=0.000]       
Log likelihood = -2411.9802   
The results shown in Table 3 also capture the extent to which the quality of private information 
affects propensities to herd. This can be seen by comparing the subjects‘ responses to three different 
types of private information: relatively clear signals for high versus low mean scenarios; 
differentially ambiguous signals for the low variance versus high variance scenarios; and the 
meaningless ―scramble‖ signal in which the private information was conveying no information at all 
(the presented stock chart was completely random). The subjects were relatively more likely to 
follow the herd in high variance scenarios and less likely to follow the herd in the ―Low variance‖ 
scenarios. Initially assuming no individual differences in the propensities to herd given high variance 
stocks, then the increased tendency to herd with high variance stocks may indicate that herd 
information is being used as a quick decision-making rule, i.e. as a heuristic, when information is 
widely dispersed and imprecise. The statistical insignificance of the high mean / low mean variable is 
not inconsistent with this explanation because whether or not the subjects are being asked to choose a 
a high mean versus low mean stock is relatively easy to discern; the clarity of private information is 
reflected in its variance whether it is a high mean or a low mean stock. This may explain the 
negative, though statistically insignificant, paramater on ―high mean‖ – for 50% of trials, the herd 
was seen foolishly to be buying either a low mean stock or rejecting a high mean stock and in this 
case the experimental subjects, on average and wisely, decided to ignore the herd signal hence the 
negative parameter on ―high mean‖. The experimental subjects were not tricked into selecting a low 
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mean stock just because the herd was selecting it. The scramble variable is negatively and 
significantly associated with the propensity to herd, i.e. herding is less likely with a scrambled chart. 
This suggests that the subjects were only following the herd when the information was unclear rather 
than completely scrambled: subjects were using the herd information more often when the signals 
were ambiguous, i.e. in the high variance scenarios, but were not persuaded to follow the herd when 
their private signal was pure noise.  
Overall, these results may reflect a rational response to the poor, ambiguous quality of the 
information. In the high variance case, it is harder to discern whether or not the stock was high mean 
or low mean and the herd information may have been allowing the subjects a quick decision-making 
rule to help them when their private information was unclear. 
Individual differences were captured in the estimations summarised in Table 4. As for the 
estimations of buying probabilities above, individual differences were included using dummy 
variables to capture subject-specific fixed effects. For 10 of the subjects the dummy variables 
capturing individual differences are significant. Also, these results partially confirm the results from 
Table 3, indicating that there is a negative association between propensities to herd and decision-
times but the association is now statistically insignificant [p=0.873]. This may reflect the fact that 
differences in decision-times are being captured by individual differences across the subjects.  
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TABLE 4: Is herding captured by individual differences? 
Dependent variable: H (=1 if agree with herd; =0 otherwise) 
n=4080     
 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Err. z P>|z| 
High mean 0.906 0.074 -1.220 0.223 
Low variance 0.524 0.043 -7.900 0.000 
Scrambled signal 0.548 0.059 -5.600 0.000 
Human herd 2.261 0.165 11.170 0.000 
Decision time 1.000 0.000 0.160 0.873 
Subject specific fixed effects (ai): 
Subject 2 2.212 0.442 3.970 0.000 
Subject 3 1.267 0.242 1.240 0.215 
Subject 4 4.262 0.938 6.590 0.000 
Subject 5 2.991 0.622 5.270    0.000 
Subject 6 1.189 0.234 0.880 0.379 
Subject 7 5.176 1.186 7.170 0.000 
Subject 8 1.692 0.332 2.690 0.007 
Subject 9 0.948 0.179 -0.280 0.776 
Subject 10 0.999 0.189 -0.010 0.994 
Subject 11 5.016 1.145 7.060 0.000 
Subject 12 1.070 0.205 0.350 0.723 
Subject 13 3.463 0.748 5.750 0.000 
Subject 14 2.839 0.584 5.070 0.000 
Subject 15 1.852 0.370 3.080 0.002 
Subject 16 1.584 0.308 2.370 0.018 
Subject 17 4.129 0.904 6.480 0.000 
LR 
2
 (21)= 444.50 [p=0.000]       
Log likelihood = -2284.3101    
In Table 5 some of the elements of those individual differences are explored in more detail using 
the specific measures of individual differences. The male subjects were significantly less likely to 
herd. Also, the older subjects were significantly less likely to herd across all scenarios, confirming 
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other research suggesting that older people are less susceptible to social pressure (Walker and 
Andrade 1996).  
TABLE 5 
Do particular characteristics increase the likelihood of 
herding? 
Dependent variable: H (=1 if agree with herd; =0 otherwise) 
n=4080     
 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Err. Z P>|z| 
High mean 0.912 0.072 -1.160 0.244 
Low variance 0.537 0.043 -7.770 0.000 
Scrambled signal 0.567 0.059 -5.410 0.000 
Human herd 2.179 0.155 10.940 0.000 
Decision time 0.999 0.000 -2.150 0.032 
Gender (M=1) 0.516 0.052 -6.570 0.000 
Age 0.976 0.011 -2.110 0.035 
Psychotic (vs. 
Socialised) 0.989 0.030 -0.380 0.703 
Extraversion 0.915 0.014 -5.660 0.000 
Impulsiveness 1.034 0.011 2.990 0.003 
Venturesomeness 1.070 0.013 5.440 0.000 
Empathy 0.967 0.012 -2.590 0.010 
LR 
2
 (12)=259.76 [p=0.000]       
Log likelihood = -2376.6829     
In terms of personality traits, herding is statistically significantly less likely amongst extraverted 
and/or empathetic individuals. There is no significant impact of psychoticism/socialisation, even 
though extraversion and empathy are associated with more sociable natures. This does not imply 
however that social influence is unimportant; it may be that socialised individuals are less susceptible 
to social influence and peer pressure. Also statistically, if there is multicollinearity between measures 
of extraversion, empathy and socialisation, then the power of the z test on the socialisation variable 
will be reduced.  
That said, other groups of traits appear to have a stronger influence, e.g. the traits associated with 
risk-taking. Herding tendencies are positively and significantly associated with venturesomeness and 
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impulsivity. This is consistent with the assertion that herding and faster decision times are both more 
likely in individuals with particular personality traits that predispose them to risk-seeking behaviour 
i.e. the venturesome and/or impulsive personalities.  
The decision time variable is again significant (at a 5% significance level) but the again the 
impact of decision-time is small. In exploring the link between personality and decision times, 
correlations were calculated between decision times and other personality traits (see Table 6).  
Table 6: CORRELATION MATRIX: Decision times versus individual 
characteristics  
 
Decision 
time 
Gender 
M=1 Age Psychotic Extravert Impulsive Venturesome Empathetic 
Decision time 1        
Gender (M=1) -0.05 1       
Age -0.01 -0.26 1      
Psychotic -0.13 -0.20 0.38 1     
Extravert -0.23 -0.48 0.24 0.35 1    
Impulsive -0.24 -0.10 0.53 0.23 0.31 1   
Venturesome -0.05 0.08 0.04 0.44 0.27 0.11 1  
Empathetic 0.30 -0.09 0.21 -0.06 -0.35 -0.01 0.16 1 
Overall, the only personality trait that is positively associated with decision times is empathy 
which may suggest that empathetic responses are reasoned rather than impulsive, emotional 
responses. So if herding is an instinctive impulsive response then, contrary to our initial hypotheses 
outlined in section 3.2,  it would be less likely amongst empathetic individuals. 
Other estimations revealed that venturesome and impulsive individuals were not only 
significantly more likely than others to herd; they were also more likely to buy high variance 
stocks.
11
 This clarifies the evidence from Table 3A about herding being more likely with high 
variance stocks and suggests that herd information is not being used objectively and systematically 
by all agents when information is unclear but is instead associated with risk-taking personality traits. 
This is consistent with the idea that herding is not simply an objectively driven heuristic to enable 
decision-making in uncertain environments; it may also be the outcome of emotionally-driven, risk-
seeking impulses. 
6. Implications and Conclusions 
The results presented here indicate that experimental subjects‘ financial choices are affected by 
herd decisions and that the propensity to herd is not homogenous but varies by gender /age and 
across personality types. In addition, the findings outlined in this paper suggest that herding can be 
                                                 
11
 Additional linear estimation results indicate significantly negative associations between venturesomeness and decision 
times [p=0.001] and between impulsivity and decision times [p=0.000]. Spearman‘s Rank correlation coefficient between 
venturesomeness and probability of buying a high variance stock is +0.20. 
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explained in terms of individual differences but herding does not appear to be specifically associated 
with a socialised personalities; in fact, the evidence presented here suggests that characteristics 
associated with sociability (e.g. extraversion and empathy) are negatively associated with herding 
tendencies. More importantly, herding is positively associated with personality traits associated with 
risk-taking, including impulsivity and venturesomeness. This may mean that it is an acquired, 
automated decision-making heuristic to enabling impulsive people to decide quickly in uncertain 
situations.  
Overall, these findings lend support to socio-psychological models which explain economic and 
financial decision-making as the outcome of subjective factors and individual differences. This does 
not completely exclude explanations of herding as a rational, objective reasoning process; in this 
sample, herding is seen with high variance stock price information suggesting that it may be a 
decision-making device used when private information is unclear and, if this is the case, then herding 
may have rational, reasoning elements.   
There are important qualifications. The results presented represent just one limited sample of 
data. More work is needed in verifying the findings. For this experimental design in particular, it 
would be important to identify other proxies, apart from decision times, for deliberative thought 
and/or Bayesian reasoning. A fuller investigation of individual differences could uncover other 
behavioural / psychological correlates of herding. Other studies suggest that intelligence is positively 
associated with empathy, extraversion and socialisation and negatively associated with impulsivity 
(Eysenck and Eysenck 1976)
12
 and so further research could explore the links between herding, 
cognitive ability and discounting parameters to test the idea that impulsivity is associated with lower 
cognitive ability and/or impatience. This might also help to explain the greater reliance on herd 
information amongst more impulsive individuals.
13
 A negative correlation between herding and 
cognitive ability might also explain the negative parameters on extraversion and empathy: if the 
essential characteristic is cognitive ability, then the empathy and extraversion variables are acting as 
proxies for cognitive ability in this analysis.  
Overall, if herding reflects an interaction of Bayesian and socio-psychological factors then 
herding models could be developed to identify the role played by emotional processing, thus 
reconciling rational and emotional / affective influences on behaviour. This could involve the 
development of neuroeconomic behavioural models in which dual processing and consilience are 
emphasised, drawing together inductions from different areas (Kahneman 2003, Glimcher and 
                                                 
12
 Though Zeidner (1995) highlights the inconsistent and contradictory evidence about the link between extraversion and 
intelligence 
13
See also Dohmen et al (2007) on risk aversion and impatience.  
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Rustichini 2004, Camerer 2007). Resolving questions about whether herding is being generated by 
cognitive and/or affective processes does require deeper delving into the motivators of behaviour so 
as to better understand the neurological black-box that generates human choice. So whilst this paper 
has focussed on distinct explanations for herding – first, as a deliberative form of social learning in 
which it is assumed that others have more or better information; and second, as an instinctive or 
impulsive emotional responses, these explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
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APPENDIX I: Experimental Instructions (presented in Powerpoint) 
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